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NO “DEAD GIVEAWAYS”: FINDING A VIABLE MODEL OF
ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE FOR NEW JERSEY
Joseph A. Romano*
I. INTRODUCTION
Testators who make every effort to preserve their assets, consult with
an attorney, and strategize their dispositions may still face the scorn of a
friend or relative who feels slighted by an unfavorable bequest. While
theoretically a testator may be of sound mind and free from undue influence
up until his last moments, it is not until after death that potential takers will
emerge to challenge the validity of his will.1 The best advocate to defend
these challenges—the testator—is no longer available to offer evidence to
the contrary, and courts must instead rely upon the often self-interested
hearsay that remains.2 Executors and estate planners alike have long been
cognizant of this “worst evidence” rule,3 as well as the headache of litigation
it often creates.
But testators are not without recourse; options exist to mitigate the
potential litany of challenges arising after death. Of these options, the ability
to seek a pre-death judgment validating one’s will as to formalities,
testamentary capacity, and freedom from undue influence has been hotly
debated.4 Ante-mortem probate, as it is more commonly known, enables
living testators to seek judicial validation of their wills to reduce the
likelihood of a will contest.5
*J.D., 2018, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Bentley University. I would like to
thank my parents, Edward and Anne Romano, for their unwavering support, as well as
Professor Solangel Maldonado for her countless draft reviews and suggestions. I would also
like to give a special thank you to the editors of the Seton Hall Law Review, without which
this publication would not have been possible.
1
John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
See generally Jacob Arthur Bradley, Antemortem Probate Is a Bad Idea: Why
Antemortem Probate Will Not Work and Should Not Work, 85 MISS. L.J. 1431 (2017); Mary
Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066 (1980); John H.
Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1978); Taren
R. Lord-Halvorson, Why Wait Until We Die? Living Probate in a New Light, 37 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REV. 543 (2012).
5
Glenn R. Kazlow et al., Ante-Mortem Probate: Why Wait Until It’s Too Late?, 214
N.J. L.J. 1051 (2013).
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Candidly, the benefits of ante-mortem probate are undeniable; a judicial
declaration of validity shields a testator’s bequests from future undue
influence and capacity challenges, arming the testator with a weapon to
defend the legitimacy of his wishes. Furthermore, ante-mortem probate is
entirely consistent with the societal value of freedom of disposition, the
principle that individuals are free to control the disposition of their property
during life and at death.6 Ante-mortem probate enhances this principle by
providing a definitive mechanism through which testators can ensure proper
succession of their legacies.
Despite its advantages, the broad shortcomings of ante-mortem probate,
such as potential family disharmony and strain on judicial resources, are
obvious impediments to its widespread adoption.7 Much like the standard
probate process, a lifetime probate proceeding is generally public in nature,
with the added presence of the testator to defend all challenges.8 This
particular aspect has the potential to create significant discord among family
members; the testator is forced to suffer the displeasure of relatives angered
by unfavorable bequests or omissions.9 Additionally, because testators may
amend or revoke a will at any time,10 the potential exists for a flood of
petitions on probate courts, resulting in excessive strain on the judicial
system.
While volumes of academic material exist to support state codification
in theory, implementation of a viable ante-mortem probate model remains
largely unexplored in practice; only a handful of states offer a mechanism
for pre-death will validation.11 Though most jurisdictions have yet to
consider the proposition, the push for ante-mortem probate in New Jersey is
gaining notable traction. After the concept was revisited in an article by
Glenn R. Kazlow,12 the New Jersey State Law Revision Commission
authorized a survey-type project to evaluate the effects of ante-mortem
probate in New Jersey.13 Specifically, the project sought feedback from local
scholars and practitioners to gain a better understanding of the effects of pre-

6
See Gerry W. Beyer, Will Contests—Prediction and Prevention, 4 EST. PLAN. &
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 51 (2011); Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift:
Competing Default Rule Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV.
273, 280 (2010).
7
See infra Part III.
8
See infra Part II.A.
9
See Fellows supra note 4, at 1075.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part II.B.
12
See Kazlow et al., supra note 5, at 1051.
13
Katherine M. Arango, Trial and Heirs: Antemortem Probate for the Changing
American Family, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 779, 795 (2016).
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death will validation.14
Responding to this inquiry, Susan G. Thatch, staff member of Counsel
for the New Jersey Law Revision Commission, published an in-depth
comment analyzing the major critiques and benefits of ante-mortem probate
in its current form.15 Thatch found ante-mortem probate to be a “valuable
estate-planning tool” and concluded that “any legislation that New Jersey
may decide to promulgate should be designed . . . to supplement New
Jersey’s current traditional form of probate and to provide individuals and
their legal advisors with another tool . . . to ensure that final wishes are
carried out after death.”16
Thatch’s comment effectively highlights the main concerns of adopting
ante-mortem legislation but leaves open for suggestion the possibility of a
workable model for New Jersey to consider. As such, Part II of this
Comment will begin by briefly addressing the evolution of ante-mortem
probate, as well as the minority of states that promulgate it. Part III will then
focus on the legal and practical considerations of adopting current models,
expanding on the points offered by Thatch, as well as presenting additional
areas of concern.17 Finally, Part IV will suggest a viable model of antemortem probate, specifically tailored to the State of New Jersey. Part V will
briefly conclude.
II. CURRENT MODELS AND APPLICATIONS OF ANTE-MORTEM PROBATE
Over the last several decades, three models have persisted to guide
states in adopting ante-mortem schemes. Each model essentially builds off
the prior one, while maintaining significant differences in application.
A. Primary Models of Ante-Mortem Probate
1. The Contest Model
The Contest Model can most aptly be characterized as identical to the
process of post-mortem probate, except for the timing in which it occurs.18
First proposed by Professor Howard Fink in 1976, the Contest Model shifts
the timing of a probate proceeding to occur while the testator is “alive and

14

Id.
Susan G. Thatch, Esq., Ante-Mortem Probate in New Jersey—An Idea Resurrected?,
39 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331 (2015).
16
Id. at 353–54.
17
For a brief summation of Thatch’s comment, see Gerry W. Beyer, Add Probating Your
Will to Your Bucket List, JOTWELL (May 25, 2016), https://trustest.jotwell.com/2016/05/
(reviewing Susan G. Thatch, Ante-Mortem Probate in New Jersey—An Idea Resurrected?, 39
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331 (2015)).
18
See Fellows, supra note 4, at 1073.
15
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able to testify . . . in direct view of the court or jury.”19
Under the Contest Model, an adversarial proceeding is initiated to
obtain a declaratory judgment as to the testator’s capacity, compliance with
execution formalities, and the presence of any undue influence.20 Parties to
the proceeding include beneficiaries under the will and those who would take
by intestate succession, although states that have adopted this model also
include beneficiaries of prior wills that are affected by the proceeding.21
Findings of validity are binding upon all parties to, or represented in, the
action.22 Once the will is declared valid, it is subsequently placed on file
with the court.23 Amendments to the will can be validated through another
proceeding of the same nature.24 Finally, to prevent the risk of an
unfavorable verdict in future actions, facts found in a proceeding are
inadmissible as evidence in actions other than for determinations of a will’s
validity.25
2. The Conservatorship Model
The Conservatorship Model was proposed by Professor John H.
Langbein in 1978, and served mainly to address concerns of family
disharmony created by the Contest Model’s non-confidential nature.26 The
Conservatorship Model attempts to strike more of a balance between the
interests of the testator and presumptive takers by improving the defensive
opportunities for potential challengers.27 Similar to Fink’s proposal under
the Contest Model, Langbein’s Conservatorship Model requires the testator
to institute a proceeding by submitting a petition to the court with the
proffered will attached.28 As a result, the will itself is publicly disclosed.29
Throughout the petition process, Langbein stresses the testator’s
obligation to be represented by counsel, not only for the purpose of ensuring
accurate preparation, but also to safeguard against potentially frivolous use
of the system.30 Notice requirements under the Conservatorship Model are
also similar to the Contest Model in that the testator must give notice of the
19

Howard D. Fink, Ante-Mortem Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life After
Death?, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264, 266 (1976).
20
Id. at 275.
21
Fellows, supra note 4, at 1073 n.27.
22
See Fink, supra note 19, at 276.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 277.
26
See Langbein, supra note 4.
27
Id. at 78.
28
Id. at 77.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 78.
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proceedings to the beneficiaries named in the will, those that would take
under intestate succession, and beneficiaries from prior wills.31
The most drastic departure from the Contest Model is undoubtedly
Langbein’s proposal of a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of any
and all beneficiaries who may be affected by a mistaken ruling.32
Specifically, the guardian ad litem is granted powers of discovery under the
supervision of the court.33 These powers include the ability to conduct
depositions or request documents that may be relevant to the court’s
determination of capacity or undue influence.34
The cost of the guardian ad litem is imposed upon the testator, so as to
discourage the testator’s abuse of the system and to alleviate presumptive
takers of the need to calculate whether bringing a challenge is worth the
cost.35 The argument may be made that such an imposition unfairly shifts
costs normally borne by contestants to the testator, depleting the future estate
as a result. Langbein contends, however, that “to permit the testator to inflict
upon his heirs apparent the choice between defaulting or bearing [the
accelerated costs of ante-mortem probate]” is a serious mistake of legislative
policy.36 Rather, Langbein insists that justice requires testators to bear the
cost of litigation, as ante-mortem probate is at the “testator’s option,
provided for the testator’s benefit.”37
Langbein additionally notes that the requirement of a guardian ad litem
would allow interested parties to bring challenges anonymously, thereby
preventing any threat of family disharmony caused by a challenge.38 A lack
of anonymity might cause the testator to reduce or eliminate a challenger’s
inheritance as a form of punishment, inflicting great strain on the familial
relationship between the testator and challenger in the process.39 Thus,
Langbein asserts that the ability to anonymously contest the will through a
guardian ad litem allows evidence of incapacity or undue influence to be
introduced without the threat of testator retaliation.40

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

See id.
Langbein, supra note 4, at 78.
Id. at 79.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Langbein, supra note 4, at 79.
Id.
Id.
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Some scholars argue that this alteration of the Contest Model is
inadequate to prevent family disharmony.41 Specifically, testators and other
parties are likely to recognize the source of a challenge.42 For example, if
the guardian ad litem submits evidence of a personal nature that only a
spouse would know, the testator might realize that the challenge came from
a spouse. Under the same example, even if such evidence did not originate
from a spouse, the testator might nevertheless assume that it did, incidentally
straining the spousal relationship in the process.
As a final matter, the Conservatorship Model does away with the option
of a jury for functional reasons of judicial experience and evidentiary
standards.43 Langbein notes that the format of an ante-mortem probate
proceeding differs drastically from post-mortem probate in the nature of
proofs.44 In a standard probate proceeding, evidence concerning the testator
is often scattered and incomplete; this makes a jury instrumental in the factfinding process.45 Alternatively, Langbein opines that the evidence in an
ante-mortem proceeding is readily available and thus better left to a judge
experienced in gerontology.46
3. The Administrative Model
The third most widely acknowledged model of ante-mortem probate
was introduced in 1979 by Professors Gregory S. Alexander and Albert M.
Pearson.47 The Administrative Model, as it was called, primarily served to
critique the confidentiality and disclosure requirements of the
Conservatorship Model.48 The Administrative Model adopts the guardian ad
litem suggested by Langbein, but operates through a purely administrative
(rather than judicial) ex parte proceeding.49
Upon petition to the court, a guardian ad litem is appointed to examine
the testator’s capacity, not as a representative of presumptive takers but
instead as an investigator for the court.50 The guardian ad litem “conducts
41

Fellows, supra note 4, at 1075.
Id.
43
Langbein, supra note 4, at 80.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 80–81. On this point, Langbein seems to infer that older individuals are the more
likely candidates for engaging in the process of ante-mortem probate. No substantial evidence
exists, however, to affirm or deny this inference. Younger individuals are equally as free to
seek pre-death will validation, as evidenced by the lack of any age restrictions in current antemortem jurisdictions. See infra Part II.B.
47
Gregory S. Alexander & Albert M. Pearson, Alternative Methods of Ante-Mortem
Probate and Procedural Due Process Limitations on Succession, 78 MICH. L. REV. 89 (1979).
48
Id. at 90.
49
Id. at 112.
50
Id. at 113–14.
42
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private interviews, evaluates the capacity of the testator, and informs the
court of the information discovered.”51 The will itself is reviewed by the
court in camera, and remains confidential throughout the entire proceeding.52
Additionally, the Administrative Model promulgates the belief that
prospective heirs have no constitutional right to notice; their potential
interests in the estate are “weak” because the testator may alter a bequest at
any point during his or her lifetime.53 Thus, Alexander and Pearson contend
that the consequences stemming from a public will and expansive notice
requirements under the Contest and Conservatorship models are effectively
eliminated.54
As a disadvantage, even the Administrative Model is argued to place
strain on family harmony. Specifically, scholars have argued that when the
court requires the guardian ad litem to investigate potential concerns,
suspicions among family members can arise.55
B. Jurisdictions Offering Ante-mortem Probate
As it stands, only a handful of states currently authorize ante-mortem
probate, while others have attempted to adopt legislation with limited
success.56 Each jurisdiction primarily draws from the adversarial approach
of Fink’s Contest Model, though several unique deviations exist with respect
to certain procedural applications.
1. The Petition Process: Who Can File
In each of the ante-mortem jurisdictions, a petition or complaint for
declaratory judgment must be submitted to the court with the proffered will
attached.57 To commence the proceeding, a majority of ante-mortem states,
including Delaware and Ohio, require that testators be domiciled or own real
property within the state.58

51

Id.
Id.
53
See Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A Viable
Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131, 169 (1990); Alexander & Pearson, supra note 47, at 115.
54
Alexander & Pearson, supra note 47, at 90.
55
Fellows, supra note 4, at 1077.
56
North Dakota, Ohio, Arkansas, Alaska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and
Delaware each maintain their own ante-mortem probate statutes. See infra Part II(B). Nevada
unsuccessfully proposed ante-mortem legislation in 2011, but currently offers a limited form
of ante-mortem probate through an amendment to its declaratory judgment statute. Id.
57
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 to -04 (Westlaw through 2017 Legis. Sess.).
58
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202 (West 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(a) (2015);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(II) (2014); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (West 1979).
52
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Alaska expands these eligibility requirements to include will-appointed
representatives or any interested party to whom the testator gives consent,
regardless of whether the testator is domiciled in Alaska.59 Along with the
petition, Alaska requires the addition of statements signed by the petitioner
affirming the contemporariness of the will, its compliance with execution
formalities, and a general statement that the testator is familiar with its
contents.60
2. Parties to the Proceeding
The petition or complaint must name and be served upon specific
parties to the will. The majority of ante-mortem jurisdictions require service
upon beneficiaries named in the will, as well as any party eligible to take
under state intestacy laws had the testator died on the date of filing.61
New Hampshire and Delaware offer the most comprehensive notice
requirements of the ante-mortem jurisdictions. A petition filed in New
Hampshire must name any “interested party,” including the petitioner’s
spouse, heirs, devisees under the will, appointed executors, and the director
of any charitable trust that is a devisee.62 An “interested party” may also be
any other person who, if the petitioner had died on the date of filing, would
be deemed an interested party in a judicial proceeding to prove the will.63
Delaware’s notice requirements drastically depart from the other six
jurisdictions. The scope of notice is broadened to include any party affected
by a power of appointment in the will, as well as “any other person the
testator wishes to be bound” by a ruling of validity.64 Most significantly,
Delaware provides a “notice statute” whereby interested parties are given
time sensitive notices to bring challenges of their own volition.65 This
directly contrasts with the other ante-mortem jurisdictions, which provide
“filing statutes” that require the testator to petition the court and initiate the
action whether or not there is an actual challenge.66

59

ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.530 (West 2010); § 13.12.540(a).
§ 13.12.545.
61
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-201 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(III)
(Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 4); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08.1-02 (Westlaw
through 2017 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081(A) (West 2012).
62
§ 552:18(III).
63
Id. While the statute does not provide specific examples of what “other” parties may
be deemed interested persons, it is likely that this is meant as a catch-all granting the court
discretion for unanticipated circumstances.
64
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(b) –(c) (2015).
65
Id.
66
See Ralph Lehman et al., Determining the Validity of Wills and Trusts–Before Death,
6 OHIO PROB. L.J. 7 (2011).
60
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3. Rulings on Construction
In a 2009 amendment to its declaratory judgment statute, Nevada
adopted a highly simplistic form of ante-mortem probate.67 The statute’s
overall comprehensiveness pales in comparison to other jurisdictions; it
narrowly enables testators to obtain a declaratory judgment as to questions
of will validity.68 One unique aspect of this statute, however, is that it also
allows testators to resolve questions of will construction, an issue which
none of the other ante-mortem jurisdictions explicitly address.69 The testator
need not be incompetent to obtain such a ruling, and may do so at any point
before his death.70
4. Binding Effect of a Ruling: Revocation and Modification
If a court deems the will valid as to formalities, testamentary capacity,
and freedom from undue influence, it will issue a binding declaration of
validity and place the will on file.71 The binding effect of the declaration
tends to vary among states, especially where a testator subsequently modifies
or revokes his will.
Jurisdictions such as Ohio and Alaska direct that the binding effect of
a declaration of validity remains effective unless and until the testator
modifies or revokes his will.72 A testator is free to revoke or amend his will
through any lawful process, but will not retain the binding declaration of
validity without going through the process again.73 Delaware mirrors the
language of these states but further provides that the binding nature of a
proceeding will not abrogate the right of a spouse to file for an elective share,
or restrict the period during which an intestate heir may claim any intestate
portion of the testator’s estate.74
By comparison, New Hampshire’s statute contains a subtle, but
noteworthy difference: upon a testator’s death, a declaration of validity will
remain binding to the extent that the testator has not modified or revoked the
will after the proceeding.75 In this regard, New Hampshire seemingly offers
the most testator-friendly provision as to the binding effect of a declaration;
a court will uphold any portion of the validated will that remains after the

67

See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.040 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 137.007 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.).
68
Id.
69
§ 30.040.
70
See id.
71
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.084 (West 1979).
72
Id.; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.555 (West 2010).
73
§ 13.12.555.
74
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311 (2015).
75
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(VII) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 4).

ROMANO (DO NOT DELETE)

1692

8/10/2018 11:42 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1683

testator’s death.76
In North Dakota, a declaration of validity is permanent unless the
testator petitions the court to modify or revoke his will.77 In such cases, the
declaration’s binding effect will cease until the testator executes a new will
and institutes another ante-mortem proceeding naming not only the parties
to the new proceeding, but any parties to former proceedings as well.78
Alternatively, Arkansas permits testators to modify or supersede a
validated will “by subsequently executed valid wills, codicils, and other
testamentary instruments, whether or not validated under a subsequent
proceeding.79 This directly contrasts with North Dakota’s requirement that
a new validation proceeding occur to revoke or modify a submitted will.80
5. Protective Measures
At least four jurisdictions have recognized the potential for challengers
to attack the validity of a will by citing a testator’s failure to utilize antemortem probate during his lifetime.81 To counter this threat, these
jurisdictions expressly provide that a testator’s failure to commence an antemortem proceeding during his lifetime cannot be used by future challengers
as evidence of lack of capacity or undue influence.82
As a final point, the public nature of an ante-mortem proceeding is
arguably one of its most significant disadvantages. Not only is the will
prematurely exposed to the testator’s heirs and devisees, but it is fully
available to the prying eyes of the public.83 Alaska is the only ante-mortem
jurisdiction that implements a comprehensive approach with respect to the
confidentiality of a proceeding. Specifically, only a notice of filing,
summary of formal proceedings, and dispositional order are made available
to the public.84 All other information related to the petition process is kept
confidential, and is only accessible by: (1) the petitioner and his or her
attorney; (2) interested parties that have appeared in the proceedings or have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court; (3) the judge who took part in the
proceeding; (4) court staff for essential authorized purposes; or (5) any other

76

Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08.1-03 (Westlaw through 2017 Legis. Sess.).
78
Id.
79
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-203 (West 1979) (emphasis added).
80
Id. Compare id., with § 30.1-08.1-03.
81
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(d) (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18 (IX)
(Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 4); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-08.1-04 (Westlaw
through 2017 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.081(B) (West 2012).
82
Id.
83
See Langbein, supra note 4, at 77.
84
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 13.12.585 (West 2010).
77
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person for good cause shown.85
III. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ANTE-MORTEM
PROBATE IN NEW JERSEY
It is undeniable that ante-mortem probate has its benefits, especially
when considering the flexibility it provides to honor a testator’s freedom of
disposition. The freedom of disposition is a fundamental principal of
donative transfer in American law, and endows testators with the “nearly
unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please.”86 Ante-mortem
probate enhances this freedom by providing testators with additional
opportunities to ensure disposition is effected in accordance with their
wishes. If New Jersey is to join the current minority of states, however,
certain legal and practical considerations must be recognized.
A. Legal Considerations
1. Standing of Interested Parties
A primary consideration of ante-mortem probate is an interested party’s
ability to establish standing. It has long been held in New Jersey that a
testator’s heirs and devisees are not identifiable until the testator’s death.87
Moreover, “no one may [challenge a will] unless she would be injured by the
probate of the will propounded.”88 Because an heir or devisee’s interest
during the testator’s lifetime is a mere expectancy or possibility,89 there can
be no certainty of injury until the will is admitted to probate. So long as the
testator is alive and able to modify or revoke the current will, any person’s
interest is a mere expectancy and thus cannot be certain.90 This ambiguity is
only further compounded by various familial changes likely to occur in a
testator’s life. A marriage, divorce, birth or adoption of a child, or even the
death of a close relative, all have the potential to affect the expectancy
interests of heirs-apparent.

85

Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (AM. LAW
INST. 2003).
87
In re Buzby’s Estate, 118 A. 835, 836 (N.J. 1922) (“The legal relation, or status, of
heirs at law and next of kin arises immediately upon the death of the ancestor . . . .”).
88
In re Myers’ Will, 119 A.2d 129, 133 (N.J. 1955).
89
In re Will of Gardner, 522 A.2d 492, 496 n.5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (noting
a devisee’s interest is mere expectancy or possibility of inheritance before the testator’s
death).
90
David L. Skidmore & Laura E. Morris, Before the Party’s over the Arguments for and
Against Pre-Death Will Contests, PROB. & PROP. 50., Mar.–Apr. 2013, at 51, 55.
86
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2. Inconsistencies with the Legal Effect of a Will
The underlying principles of ante-mortem probate are fundamentally
inconsistent with the legal nature of a will.91 Like many jurisdictions, New
Jersey has historically recognized the effect of a will to be inoperative until
the testator’s death.92 This principle serves the practical purpose of allowing
testators to freely plan their dispositions without the interference of lifetime
challenges.93 Alternatively, an ante-mortem probate system accelerates will
contests into proceedings that occur before the testator has died.94 By
allowing interested parties to challenge a will during the testator’s lifetime,
courts would essentially be acknowledging the will as an effective
instrument, despite decades of precedent to the contrary.95
B. Practical Considerations
The legal considerations of ante-mortem probate are only further
supplemented by an extensive range of practical difficulties arising from the
nature of pre-death will validation. While each ante-mortem jurisdiction
offers measures to counteract some of these difficulties, no state has yet
availed itself of them entirely.
1. Family Disharmony
For the ante-mortem states that have adopted variations of the Contest
Model, a significant drawback lies in the proceeding’s sacrifice of
confidential testamentary disposition during the testator’s lifetime.96 This
fact, scholars argue, has the potential to disrupt family harmony, straining
the relationship between the testator and presumptive takers who come to
discover that their inheritance is unfavorable.97
Professor Fink, founder of the Contest Model, agreed with this
sentiment in his proposal, but ultimately questioned whether such
disharmony was any more apparent than in a post-mortem contest.98 While
91

Id. at 52.
See Salvemini v. Giblin, 130 A.2d 842, 843 (N.J. 1957) (holding a will cannot operate
in a testator’s lifetime); Miller v. Reich, 34 A.2d 143, 145 (N.J. Ch. 1943) (“A will, however,
becomes effective as of the time of the death of the testatrix, and its operative effect is
regulated by the law existing at that time.”); In re Will of Reilly, 493 A.2d 32, 35 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1985) (“[A] will ordinarily is ambulatory and speaks only as of the death of the
testator.”).
93
Id.
94
See generally infra Part II.A.
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plausible, Fink too broadly generalizes the unique implications of family
disharmony in the ante-mortem setting. While family disharmony can arise
before or after the testator’s death, its occurrence during the testator’s
lifetime is particularly detrimental. In death, the testator can avoid any
anguish of familial tension caused by his or her bequests. Alternatively,
ante-mortem probate forces such tribulations into the testator’s lifetime. The
testator must not only endure the disharmony that would have arisen among
heirs in the post-mortem context, but is additionally exposed to the direct
resentment of interested parties. Thus, states must be wary not to generalize
conceptions of family disharmony in the ante-mortem setting, and instead
should consider how best to mitigate these unique implications.
Alternatively, Susan Thatch opines that states prohibiting ante-mortem
probate for reasons of family disharmony is “seemingly paternalistic” and
denies testators the flexibility of a “valuable estate-planning tool.”99 One
can see how this conclusion might be reached: such a prohibition dubiously
presumes that testators are unable to bear any strain on familial relationships,
and thus should be barred from ante-mortem probate entirely. As opposed
to Professor Fink’s broader view, Thatch’s claim is arguably narrow in that
it overlooks the substantial implications of family disharmony in favor of
ante-mortem probate’s benefits. Although prohibiting ante-mortem probate
solely for reasons of family disharmony indeed seems paternalistic, states
should not necessarily disregard its effects altogether. Instead, states should
evaluate and mitigate the effects of family disharmony as equally as any
obstacle. Overlooking family disharmony and instead focusing only on the
benefits of ante-mortem probate would be a disservice to testators and
interested parties alike; familial tensions that could have been avoided by
creative legislation are ignored as a result. Thus, while family disharmony
should not be dispositive in a state’s decision to adopt ante-mortem probate,
its effects should be fairly considered to provide the most efficient model for
both individuals and courts.
2. Size of Estate at Death
It is not unlikely that a testator could die with a minimal amount of
property in his estate, or even nothing at all.100 If a testator dies with nothing
to distribute, any proceedings initiated to validate the will during his lifetime
are rendered unnecessary.101 “If the testator, will contestants, and the court
invest resources on a lifetime will contest, and the testator subsequently fails
to leave an estate worth fighting about, then public and private funds would

99
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be wasted.”102 Under the Contest Model, this dilemma is especially
burdensome on presumptive takers, as they must bear the costs of any
challenge.103
3. Judicial Resources
Perhaps the most common threat of pre-death will validation is the
strain that it could place on judicial resources.104 Because testators reserve
the right to revoke or amend any will validated through ante-mortemprobate, there is no limitation on how often such a proceeding could be
initiated.105 While Professor Langbein predicts that testators using antemortem probate would rarely wish to revoke or modify their validated
wills,106 it is hardly unforeseeable that even a modest number of testators
could bring multiple proceedings that would not have occurred under a
standard probate system. While no overwhelming authority exists to
emphasize the severity of such abuse, the fact that testators have the ability
to bring multiple proceedings is nonetheless an unnecessary and avoidable
risk.
While repeated contests brought under multiple proceedings seem less
likely to occur,107 the testator’s abuse of judicial resources (whether or not
intentional) could nonetheless severely limit a court’s efficiency. In this
sense, Langbein’s suggestion that testators be obligated to initiate each
proceeding with the assistance of counsel would help to limit excessive
amendments or revocations with respect to a validated will.108 That said,
there are certainly legitimate reasons as to why a testator might need to
update his validated will on multiple occasions. In such cases, Professor
Fink suggests a statute allowing minor changes that would not affect a ruling
of testamentary capacity or undue influence.109
4. Notice
Even if a testator is able to validate his will in a proceeding, the binding
nature of any resulting judgment is only applicable to those parties who
receive proper notice.110 In cases where interested parties receive defective
102
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notice, or none at all, the risk of a post-death will contest remains
significant.111 Thus, under a model requiring notice, the effectiveness of a
proceeding depends largely upon the testator’s ability to not only keep track
of those individuals whom he wishes to devise property, but also any
intestate successors whom he does not consider, especially where there has
been a birth or death after the proceeding.112 Under New Jersey’s current
probate system, a variety of beneficiaries not contemplated by the testator
are protected by omitted child and anti-lapse statutes.113 In the case of antemortem probate, however, these measures would not protect the testator
from the claims of such unknown beneficiaries if they did not receive notice
of the original proceeding.
5. Testator Migration
It is unclear whether the binding nature of a validity declaration would
retain its effect if the testator relocated to a state that did not offer antemortem probate.114 Comparable precedent exists, however, to resolve such
a conflict. For instance, New Jersey courts have held that where testators
migrate from community property states to separate property states, “the law
of the place of the domicile of the acquiring spouse at the time of the
acquisition governs the determination of whether the acquired property is
separate or community.”115 In a similar manner, a court could defer to the
law of the testator’s domicile in cases of migration.
6. Inference of Invalidity
A final point on the legal concerns of ante-mortem probate include
litigious threats that may present themselves if not carefully addressed
during legislative consideration. Where a state offers some process of will
validation during the lifetime of a testator, and the testator fails to utilize
such a process, potential challengers may be able to assert an inference of
invalidity during the probate process. While the burden of proof is always
on the challenger of a duly executed will,116 a testator’s failure to validate his
or her will when the process was available may serve as fodder for litigation.
As discussed previously, states such as Delaware have avoided this pitfall by
explicitly denying as evidence of invalidity that ante-mortem probate was
111

Skidmore & Morris, supra note 90, at 52; Press Release, N.Y.C. B. Ass’n, supra note
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not used.117
IV.

A WORKABLE MODEL FOR NEW JERSEY

The State of New Jersey has yet to adopt a model of ante-mortem
probate. Rather, the State employs post-mortem probate which considers
mental capacity and undue influence only after the testator’s death.118 If New
Jersey is to join the minority states and pursue a course of legislation
adopting ante-mortem probate, it should do so by incorporating the strongest
aspects of other state laws while at the same time mitigating the effects of
the implications outlined above.
Susan Thatch’s comment offers valuable insight pertinent to New
Jersey’s adoption of an ante-mortem scheme, but leaves the framework of a
suitable model open to discussion.119 Combining Thatch’s considerations
with the model frameworks presented by legal scholars, a wealth of
information exists to begin proposal of a model specifically tailored to New
Jersey.
A. Petition
New Jersey’s first major consideration in adopting ante-mortem
probate should be the petition process through which a testator may initiate
a proceeding. To have standing to file a petition, current states require that
the testator be domiciled in the state or, at the very least, own real property
in the state.120 Like Delaware, New Jersey should permit only testators that
are domiciled in the state to take advantage of pre-death will validation.121
On one hand, the obvious drawback to this proposal is the fact that a
testator owning real property in New Jersey, but residing in another antemortem jurisdiction, could never fully validate his will without the
requirement of an ancillary proceeding in New Jersey. This would allow
interested parties, otherwise bound by the determination of the domicile
state, to challenge the disposition of the New Jersey real property. On the
other hand, the primary benefit of this proposal would serve to lessen an
influx of ante-mortem proceedings brought by testators who do not reside in
the state. This could help to reduce any potential strain on judicial resources,
allowing the court to focus on matters strictly relating to New Jersey, rather
than attending to ancillary ante-mortem proceedings involving wills from
other jurisdictions.

117
118
119
120
121

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311(d) (West 2015).
See Thatch, supra note 15, at 347; N.J. CT. R. 4:80-1.
See generally Thatch, supra note 15.
See supra Part II.B.
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While disallowed in some jurisdictions, a testator’s guardian,
conservator, or attorney-in-fact should be permitted to commence the
proceeding on behalf of a testator who is physically incapable of doing so
himself.122 Where a guardian’s presence is required, it is likely that a
testator’s mental and/or physical state may become the basis for capacity and
undue influence challenges. To protect against such challenges, and to
ensure certainty in the testator’s dispositions, a guardian’s ability to initiate
a proceeding on behalf of the testator is crucial.
Finally, consistent with Alaska’s requirements, the petition should
include signed statements by the petitioner affirming the contemporariness
of the will, its compliance with execution formalities, and a general
statement that the testator is familiar with its contents.123 Imposing such a
thorough standard will help to reduce potential challenges of fraud, which
can be brought by interested parties regardless of the binding nature of a predeath will validation.124
B. Notice
The next major element in initiating an ante-mortem probate
proceeding is deciding upon whom, if at all, notice should be served. In
determining whether interested parties should receive notice, the Contest and
Administrative models are in direct tension.125 All of the ante-mortem
probate states offer variations of the Contest Model.126 As stated, the Contest
Model requires interested parties to be named in the proceeding, during
which the contents of the will are disclosed.127 This lack of confidentiality
has been considered the model’s largest flaw, especially because of its
potential to strain family relationships.128 Nonetheless, notice served under
the Contest Model is the most preferable option in that it ensures finality in
the proceeding.129
Alternatively, some scholars have advocated the no-notice style of the
Administrative Model as an ideal way to mitigate the concerns of public
disclosure and confidentiality.130 This proposal, however, fails to address
122

This is not to be confused with a testator who lacks the capacity to create or amend a
will, in which case a guardian could not utilize ante-mortem probate to validate the testator’s
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the increased risk that a lack of notice would contribute to an erroneous
finding of validity.131 The Administrative Model “subverts the goal of
improving fact-finding during living probate because it precludes interested
parties who possess relevant information” from participating in the
process.132 As a result, the risk of a court upholding an invalid will under
this model is significantly higher. Additionally, the no-notice approach has
no better chance in deterring family disharmony; parties who are questioned
by a guardian ad litem are likely to become indignant when a testator refuses
to reveal the contents of his will.133 Thus, to promote finality and ensure that
invalid wills are not upheld, New Jersey should require interested parties to
be given notice of the proceeding.
If notice is to be required, the inquiry then turns on who may be entitled
to receive it. Like New Hampshire, interested persons should include the
petitioner’s spouse, heirs, devisees under the will, appointed executors, the
director of any charitable trust that is a devisee, and any other persons whom
the court would deem interested parties if the petitioner died on the date of
filing.134 This broad definition of interested persons must exist for two
reasons. First, by requiring notice to as many interested parties as possible,
the testator can ensure that the binding effect of a declaratory judgment will
not be overridden by a forgotten challenger. This will not only benefit the
testator, but will add to the finality of a proceeding, thus sparing the court
from having to hear another challenge even though it issued a valid ruling.
Second, and for the same reasons the Administrative Model fails, a broad
requirement of notice will better serve to uncover all the facts and
circumstances necessary to the court’s decision.
The final proposal for notice is arguably the most dramatic, and entails
how parties may issue a challenge. A majority of ante-mortem jurisdictions
impose a “filing statute,” which requires the testator to petition the court and
initiate the action whether or not there is an actual challenge.135 Delaware,
on the other hand, provides for a “notice statute,” whereby interested parties
are given a time sensitive notices and may bring challenges of their own
volition.136 In making its determination, New Jersey should decide in favor
of adopting a “notice statute” similar to Delaware’s. By putting the onus on
the challenger to come forward, the court is relieved of excessive or frivolous
claims. On the other hand, some practitioners believe that requiring
interested parties to initiate the action, rather than respond to one, imposes
131
132
133
134
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136

Fellows, supra note 4, at 1081.
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Fellows, supra note 4, at 1077.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18(III) (West 2014).
See supra Part II.B.; Lehman, supra note 66.
See supra Part II.B.; Lehman, supra note 66.
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too great a burden.137 Though a viable contention, placing the burden on
challengers is more consistent with honoring freedom of disposition;
testators can more easily control the disposition of their property without the
impediment of weak or meritless claims. Because a “notice statute” does not
afford challengers with the same ease of access as a “filing statute,”
challengers are forced to evaluate the strength of their claims and weigh the
overall costs and benefits of bringing suit. Thus, a “notice statute” would
provide a filter of sorts against claims that would not otherwise be brought
and for this reason should be incorporated in future ante-mortem probate
statutes.
C. Hearing
With respect to the proceeding itself, there are several elements New
Jersey should consider adopting from other states, and some that should be
disregarded altogether. As Professor Langbein’s Conservatorship Model
suggests, an ante-mortem proceeding should be conducted without a jury.138
Not only is the evidence in an ante-mortem proceeding readily available and
better left to an experienced judge, but statistics also suggest that juries tend
to favor the circumstances of challengers.139 This implication has strong
potential to upset the balance of power between the testator and interested
parties.140 Therefore, the fact-finding stage of the proceeding is better left to
the impartiality of a judge, as Langbein suggests.141
Like Nevada, New Jersey should also limit the scope of the proceeding
to matters of validity and refrain from allowing courts to issue rulings on
construction.142 Legal scholars have noted that while the availability of the
testator may help to resolve construction related ambiguities, there is no
certainty that a court may nonetheless overlook them and issue a valid
judgment.143 Next, and more importantly, the efficiency of the proceeding
risks being undercut by a lengthy and complicated resolution of ambiguities
that “may never be relevant or important.”144 As such, the power to issue a
binding ruling on matters of construction seems too comprehensive a
measure, and should be avoided to prevent additional points of conflict.
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Another important factor not explicitly recognized by all ante-mortem
jurisdictions is the effect that a proceeding could have on a spousal elective
share. Like Delaware, New Jersey should clearly express that a spouse’s
right to an elective share is not influenced by a pre-death declaration of
validity.145 Under certain conditions, a spouse may bring a claim in New
Jersey for one-third of a deceased spouse’s estate, regardless of whether the
surviving spouse received an inheritance under the will.146 While the
function of ante-mortem probate is to assess and honor a testator’s wishes,
such wishes are irrelevant for purposes of determining the spousal right to
an elective share. As such, the superiority of the elective share should be
expressly reaffirmed in any adoption of ante-mortem probate legislation.
New Jersey must also be cognizant of challengers attempting to argue
an inference of invalidity in cases where a testator failed to institute an antemortem proceeding. A strict prohibition like the ones imposed by Ohio,
Delaware, and New Hampshire should be utilized as a preventative
measure.147
D. Revocation and Modification
Once a court has determined the will’s validity, it should be sealed and
stored in the offices of the probate court. As explained earlier, states differ
as to how a will may be revoked or modified once the proceeding has
concluded.148 In deciding its approach, New Jersey should take the middle
ground between North Dakota’s requirement that another proceeding be
instituted, and other states which allow the will to be revoked or modified at
the testator’s discretion.149 That is, a testator should be required to revoke or
amend the will by submitting a notice to the court.150 If the testator’s ability
to do so is impaired by illness, immobility, or substantial inconvenience,
flexibility should be afforded to allow a representative or guardian to act on
the testator’s behalf.
Requiring notice to the court not only lessens the types of modification
restraints imposed by North Dakota, but also eliminates the possibility of
“unfounded or erroneous allegations that the . . . will has been revoked[,]
without imposing another costly and time consuming procedure . . . .”151
That said, this requirement could not be absolute. Should the testator
145
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perform an otherwise valid revocation in his or her lifetime without
submitting notice, it would be contrary to widely accepted principles to bar
revocation on the basis that notice to the court was not submitted.
Accordingly, a rebuttable presumption must exist to uphold the notice
requirement without excluding principles of modification and revocation.
Thus, absent notice to the court, a will validated through ante-mortem
probate should be presumed not revoked, unless rebutted with clear and
convincing evidence that the testator performed a valid revocation in
accordance with established state law and/or the Uniform Probate Code.
Because any revocations or modifications are made subsequent to a
proceeding, they are generally not entitled to the binding effect of an antemortem judgment. In his proposal of the Contest Model, Professor Fink
noted the potential for excessive proceedings instituted by the testator to
retain the binding effect of validity for minor changes.152 Fink addressed this
issue by suggesting that states create a statute allowing certain minor changes
to be made, without losing the binding effect of validity.153 This could be
another useful way to reduce the burden on judicial resources. Such changes
could include changing an executor, adding contingent beneficiaries, or
updating the contact information of certain parties.
Finally, to avoid negating the binding effect of a judgment in its
entirety, New Jersey should also consider adopting the language of New
Hampshire’s testator-friendly provision.154 That is, a previously validated
will should remain binding to the extent it has not been modified or revoked
by the testator.155 Such a provision would salvage the binding effect as to
portions of the will unchanged by the testator, thus allowing the testator to
more freely dispose of his property without the fear of wholly forfeiting the
binding effect of a judgment.
E. Legal Fees
New Jersey is unique in its approach to legal fees with respect to
challenges issued in a probate matter. Where probate is granted and a
contestant has reasonable cause for contesting the validity of a will, the court
may direct the contestant’s attorney fees to be paid out of the estate.156 This
requirement is in direct contention with the Contest Model’s imposition of
costs on presumptive takers, though it bears strong resemblance to the cost
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shifting directive of the Conservatorship Model.157
While New Jersey might be tempted to lean towards the same cost
shifting requirement for ante-mortem proceedings, doing so would provide
too great an advantage to contestants. This policy would force testators into
an inherently unfair dilemma; either initiate a proceeding and pay the costs
of any reasonable challenges, or refrain from utilizing ante-mortem probate
altogether. Unlike a post-mortem proceeding where only a beneficiary’s
interest may be reduced, the testator in an ante-mortem proceeding is still
very much alive and will be directly impacted by an assessment of contestant
fees. This is an obvious conflict for both policy reasons and standards of
general fairness. As such, New Jersey should strongly consider altering its
contestant fee rule to account for these unique circumstances, should antemortem probate be adopted.
V.

CONCLUSION

Even the most carefully drawn will may invariably face retaliation from
parties who feel they have been disfavored. Though individuals have many
tools at their disposal to mitigate post-mortem contests, a testator’s ability to
face these challenges in person is unparalleled. Not only does ante-mortem
probate allow the best evidence (the testator’s own testimony of his wishes)
to come forward, but it also reinforces the value society places on the
freedom of disposition. While nationwide codification is arguably still in its
infancy, the current minority states offer enough of a resource for New Jersey
to evaluate the positives and negatives of ante-mortem probate and make an
informed decision based on the considerations that have been set forth.
While there are “no dead giveaways” with respect to a perfect model, the
benefits of ante-mortem probate are undeniable and therefore should be
readily placed at a testator’s disposal.
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